How many more times will a smug. introverted small-l liberal elite run headlong into reality and blame everyone except itself? I heard this morning a despairing pundit saying that she couldn’t believe anyone could be “undecided”, let alone vote for Trump. Somebody else told me that it was “incomprehensible and unacceptable” that so many Americans could choose him over Kamala Harris.
It reminds me of Brexit, and of Trump’s victory last time. Until my lot — the sort of people who read the Economist (or write for it), go to Davos, and for whom the world turns easily — until we realise that a big chunk of our fellow-citizens are thoroughly fed up, they will vote for people and causes that we find abhorrent.
I wrote earlier about my trip to Pennsylvania, and how cross my DC-based friends were when I told them that sensible, patriotic, intelligent fellow-Americans were voting for Trump. Campus liberalism — doctrinaire, heresy-hunting, festooned with taboos and shibboleths— retreats into petulance at the fact that the majority of voters thinks differently.
More on that later. For now we have to worry about our safety and freedom. Here’s the piece I wrote early this morning for CEPA and my foreign-language outlets.
Best regards, Edward
Trump Cards: A Survival Kit
How Europe should prepare for four bumpy years.
By Edward Lucas
November 6, 2024
Europe is big and rich. Russia has an economy the size of Italy. The United States needs allies. We can do this. Leaders in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, and London should keep those four facts in mind as they try to manage transatlantic relations and their own security over the next four years.
First, defense budgets will have to rise. In the best case, Donald Trump is impressed by the growing European contributions to NATO and agrees to continue the US military backstop. In the worst case, he decides that the cost and risk of defending Europe is still unsustainable. That will not mean the formal end of NATO. But without the commander-in-chief’s willingness to go to war on behalf of European allies, the Article 5 collective-defence clause of the Atlantic Charter means nothing.
In that case, Europe will have to spend even more on defense. Not the 2% of GDP, which is the formal benchmark, or the 3-4% now being spent by frontline states such as Poland, but 5%-plus – the level that was common during the Cold War. That will have to fill huge gaps in logistics, surveillance, high-tech weaponry and other capabilities provided for decades by the Americans.
Either way, the time to start is now. Finding savings in other spending categories to pay for the military boost will be painful. Economic growth makes budgets bigger. So now would be a good time for European leaders to take seriously Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness. It would also be a good time for Sir Keir Starmer’s government to dump its “red lines” that prevent any discussion of a British return to the single market and customs union.
In all this, the top priority must be financial and other support for Ukraine. Russia, buoyed by the Trump-Vance victory, is likely to press for Kyiv’s complete capitulation. That would be catastrophic for European security. It will send millions of refugees heading westward and give a huge boost to the Kremlin’s war machine.
Europe will need alternatives to NATO, where the Trump-Orban axis is likely to paralyze decision-making. “Minilateral” security arrangements such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, a 10-country Nordic-Baltic grouping, plus the Netherlands, nominally led by Britain, will take on more significance. France and Germany remain the engine of European decision-making (currently stalled). They need to bring Poland, Italy, and Britain into Europe’s big-country club. (More priorities for the Starmer government).
Some countries will try to keep their bilateral security ties with the US. Here a dose of flattery may work. Try renaming the highway from the airport “Donald Trump Avenue.” (something that Georgia did for President George W Bush). Offer parades and flypasts. But avoid the temptation to make bilateral trade bargains. The best chance of stopping ruinous protectionism is for a united EU to play hardball.
Europeans must also start taking American geopolitical concerns more seriously. Instead of appeasing the regimes in Tehran and Beijing, see what we can do to constrain them. European attitudes to the Chinese Communist Party, in particular, have been cowardly and greedy. That needs to change: boosting supply-chain resilience with “de-risking” and “friend-shoring” is an urgent task where Europe’s economic weight will be vital.
All of this is overdue. None of it will be easy. But the decisions are Europe’s to make. The only impediments are our own timidity and distraction. We do not have Russian tanks rolling down the streets of our cities, or Chinese warships blockading our sea routes, forcing us to make concessions. We are not running out of soldiers and seeing our cities pounded to rubble, like Ukraine.
Not yet.