Welcome to this week’s Active Measures.
Finally, a US administration willing to say and do something effective about the Kremlin’s kleptocratic mischief-making. Better late than never. East-West relations have for years been like a tennis game where only one side has the serve. Not any more.
Still, I see three problems:
1) Where’s Europe? These sanctions will really bite if the EU (or big countries like France and Germany) take part as well. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian foreign ministers just flew into Kyiv to show support: nice, but not so long ago the US used to have some bigger allies in continental Europe.
2) These are (for now at least) quite small potatoes. It’s nice to see Southfront targeted: it’s a cleverly designed website aimed at military veterans and wannabe Rambos (and at Germans too — read this investigation in Die Welt). But it’s niche. It hardly matches, say, the multi-billion dollar, influence-pumping Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany.
3) It’s odd to single out SolarWinds as a particularly egregious Russian cyber-attack. This was just the sort of operation that GCHQ, NSA or any other self-respecting spy agency can, would and does do. Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s power grid was far more damaging, and deserving of punishment.
So what happens now? Putin can’t retaliate symmetrically because Russia is so much weaker. If the Kremlin bans trade in US Treasuries, who cares? As I noted for CEPA, Western leaders and their families can survive missing the chance to see Lake Baikal, open an account in Sberbank, or educate their children at MGIMO. For the Russian elite, being cut off from the fleshpots of France, the Ivy League, and the London capital markets is rather more serious.
Biden’s offer of a summit underlines this weakness. Meeting the US President, even for an icy exchange, makes Russia look like a superpower, rather than an Italy-sized economy with nuclear weapons. Staying away looks petulant. Agreeing to go would have in effect accepted that the US sets the rules.
Meanwhile, the new sanctions have escalation measures built in to deter Russia from upping pressure on Ukraine. I don’t think outright war is looming. The flashpoint may be Russia’s new naval blockade of the Sea of Azov. But the fighting would be on land — and there’s no sign yet that the big Russian build-up there is actually readying for conflict. Before that happens, we would first see a propaganda blitz, cyber-attacks and lots of confusion.
By the way, there’s a deal to be done, with Ukraine restoring water supplies to fast-desertifying Crimea in return for Russian concessions elsewhere. Don’t rule it out once everyone’s frazzled, bored and scared.
I’m more worried about Taiwan. China’s ramping up the military pressure. The US administration wants European allies to do more. Expect to see people tiptoeing to Taipei in the coming weeks and months.
What I’ve been doing:
getting ready for the launch of my big report on Russian/Chinese overlap in eastern Europe. Takeaway: China’s role so far is largely a nothingburger — handy for posturing leaders such as Vučić (Serbia) and Orbán (Hungary), but far less important seen from Beijing.
finishing my Baltic Sea region security report. Takeaway: things have never been safer, but security depends perilously on an unsustainable level of US support.
What I’ve been writing: my CEPA column argues that it’s really the West, not Ukraine, that Putin is targeting. My Times column is on a similar theme.
I so enjoy writing the China Influence Monitor, poking fun at the obnoxious pomposity of China’s Wolf Warrior diplomats, and at the spineless duplicity of so many Westerners.
That’s it — I will be back in your inboxes next week.
Best regards, Edward