Off to Ankara
A new departure
BISC is hosting a side event at the Nato summit. Sadly it’s sold out, but ping me if you are in Ankara and I will try to squeeze you in
https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/secret-agency-why-narvas-not-next-and-other-myths-tickets-1992352717611
Here’s this week’s weekly column
False flags: war of nerves
Russia is too weak to fight NATO militarily. But it can attack in other ways
On August 31, 1939, Nazi SS officers disguised as Poles attacked the radio station in the then German town of Gleiwitz. They broadcast a brief message, leaving dead bodies and an excuse for Adolf Hitler to attack Poland.
US intelligence sources, echoed by politicians, think that the Kremlin is planning a similar false-flag provocation. The stunt would involve Ukrainian drones (bought or hijacked) under Russian direction. They might hit targets in Poland, further alienating public and official opinion: the Polish security service is already worried about its Ukrainian counterparts’ robust habits.
Another more alarming variant involves these Ukrainian drones, supposedly launched from Poland or the Baltics, hitting targets (probably civilian) in Kaliningrad. Russia would blame its neighbours for facilitating these attacks, and demand countermeasures: investigations, prosecutions, compensation etc. At best that would be diplomatic blackmail. At worst it would be a pretext for a Russian counterstrike on Nato territory. Such an attack would probably be symbolic, with nobody hurt or killed. But then what? Doing nothing sets a terrible precedent. If the country targeted by the Russians hits back against Russian territory, would other Nato countries back it, or call for “dialogue”? Such worries are already corrosive.
The most important point to bear in mind here is that any such false-flag operation cannot be a pretext for a real war. Russia is too weak militarily to invade any Nato country. It is building some military infrastructure, notably on the border with Finland, but it has no soldiers to put there. Even if it started scraping together forces from the Ukraine front to deploy in Kaliningrad, Pskov or anywhere else on its western border, neighbouring countries would notice at once. They and their allies will react, reinforcing, mobilising and mustering deterrent power.
Whatever Russia is planning is in a different domain, a war of nerves, aimed at our brains, not our territory. One aim is to depict the frontline states as hotheads, who will drag the rest of the alliance into escalation and disaster. Another, complementary, goal is to make the frontline states doubt their allies’ resolve: they must believe that the “old West” secretly despises them and will not fight for them.
The Kremlin arch-crony Nikolai Patrushev pushes these lines in a sulphurous recent interview for Rossiskaya Gazeta, accusing Lithuanian politicians of wanting to drag all Europe into the “reckless gamble” of an attack on Kaliningrad (this plan, of course, exists only in Russian imagination). He also claimed that [west] Europeans, led by Britain, honed their racist hatreds on what they regarded as the “sub-human” peoples of the Baltic, adding with a flourish that an alumnus of Eton (Britain’s most exclusive private school) “would never view an Estonian or a Latvian as an equal”.
The response to this cognitive barrage should be confident, disciplined, speedy and sophisticated. First, do not amplify the enemy’s message (Finland is exemplary here). Second, ensure that any provocation is convincingly attributed to its real source: Russia. Just because the Kremlin may obtain Ukrainian drones, or even hire Ukrainians to launch them, does not mean that Ukraine is attacking Poland, or using Poland to attack Kaliningrad. Remember: Russia’s lie machine works at high speed and at high volume. Third, any subsequent Russian demands or threats must meet a united diplomatic and military response: that any attack on Nato territory, anywhere, on any pretext, will be punished severely.
Nato leaders should use this week’s summit in Ankara to warn the Kremlin to back off, and to point out that false flag operations can backfire. Gleiwitz is now the Polish town of Gliwice. What was Kaliningrad’s old name?
And here is a version of this week’s column in the Times
Russia’s economic woes spell doom for Putin
As shortages worsen and prices rise, the West should tighten sanctions to speed the downward spiral
Never leave home without a string bag — you never know what you might find on sale. That was a key Soviet survival tip as the evil empire entered its death throes. In the summer of 1990 I went shopping for a bicycle but found only cross-country skis. I bought them.
It was not only the irksome absence of goods in the shops that corroded Soviet rule but the uncertainty and humiliation they brought to daily life. This changed after 1991. Russia did not become a law-governed democracy but it did start building a functioning economy. First, liberalised prices allowed supply and demand to work across its vast landmass. A decade later, the great achievement was to consolidate that, with wages and pensions paid punctually and a stable, functioning banking system.
Russians prize that normality greatly and it underpins Vladimir Putin’s hold on power. Never in its history has the country so enjoyed the modest security and comforts we take for granted: the expectation that today will be like yesterday, and tomorrow like today. That normality has ended.